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Many state and local governments have focused on enacting policies to 
promote entrepreneurship in an effort to enhance economic growth. This 
paper will test the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and state 
economic freedom in a Granger causality framework. We build a panel 
data set of freedom scores and entrepreneurial activity measures within the 
fifty US states from 1981 to 2003, and our results show that, as a whole, 
economic freedom causes entrepreneurship. However, we find evidence 
that once entrepreneurs are in place, they increase the size of government 
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I. Public Policy and the Entrepreneur 
Many state and local governments have recently focused on enacting policies to promote 
entrepreneurship in an effort to enhance economic growth, as entrepreneurial activity has 
long been associated with being the driving force behind economic progress and growth. 
To date, research has focused mainly on the impact that state or national policies have 
had on entrepreneurial activity by isolating a few policy indicators or tax measures and 
testing their impact on entrepreneurship.  
Holtz-Eakin (1999), in a survey of the literature on estate taxes, concludes that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to bare the burden of estate taxes because they are 
inherently more exposed to the taxation of wealth accumulation. Thus, death taxes, which 
directly reduce the ability of entrepreneurs to pass on their entrepreneurial gains to fund 
future generations of entrepreneurs, lead to less entrepreneurial activity in the states that 
enact such laws.  
Bruce (2000) examines income and payroll taxes of the self-employed and wage-
and-salary workers to see if tax differentials affect the choice to be self employed. The 
author finds that the differential tax treatment significantly affects the probability of 
leaving self employment for a wage-and-salary job. Bruce (2002) extends his original 
work to allow for the endogeneity of individual tax rates, and the author finds that taxes 
have mixed effects on the level of entrepreneurial activity. Then, Bruce and Mohsin 
(2006) goes on to show that federal income, payroll, capital gains, corporate income, and 
estate taxes can have significant but small effects on entrepreneurial activity in the US 
states. Bruce’s results highlight the overall findings of the previous literature that have 
  1Kreft and Mafi-Kreft: Preliminary Working Draft 
 
not presented conclusive evidence on the relationship between income tax rates and 
entrepreneurial activity.  
A recent strand of literature has used economic freedom indexes to gauge how 
effective the local policy environment is to create, or encourage, entrepreneurship. 
Generally these indexes attempt to condense into a single number the degree of economic 
freedom individuals have in a geographic area in several key categories such as low 
taxes, low regulations, and secure property rights. Kreft and Sobel (2005) model the 
growth of sole proprietorships in the US states and conclude that underlying economic 
freedoms, measured by a state economic freedom index scores, generate growth in 
entrepreneurship because there is an institutional environment that is conducive to 
entrepreneurs. 
The aim of the current paper is to extend Kreft and Sobel (2005) to include 
causality tests between economic freedom indicators and measures of entrepreneurial 
activity. Specifically, we run Granger causality test between economic freedom and two 
measures of entrepreneurship: sole proprietors and patent activity in the fifty US states 
from 1981-2003. Our results suggest that economic freedom does cause entrepreneurship, 
especially in regard to two of the major components of economic freedom: labor market 
flexibility and low taxation. However, we also find that entrepreneurial activity causes 
growth in the size of government spending, which is correlated with a reduction in 
economic freedom. Thus, we demonstrate that proper tax construction and labor market 
regulation can attract and promote entrepreneurship; however, once a base of 
entrepreneurs is generated within a given state, they will effectively elicit financial 
support form the governing body. 
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II. Economic Freedom 
Generally economic freedom indexes attempt to condense into a single number the 
degree of economic freedom individuals have in a geographic area in several key 
categories such as low taxes, low regulations, and secure property rights. The freedom 
index that we use is developed by Karabegovic, McMahon, and Black (2006), and is a 
composite index measure of many public policies that affect the economic freedom of 
individuals in the fifty US states. Within this index, a higher freedom score in one state 
signals more economic freedom exist in that state relative to others.  
The authors construct two different freedom indexes that differ by what 
government levels are included in the index’s coverage. First, an index is created that 
reflects the policies that are put in place by federal, state, and local governments (what is 
referred to as the all-government economic freedom index).  Second, an index is created 
that reflects the policies that are put in place by state and local governments only (what is 
referred to as the state and local government economic freedom index). Furthermore, 
each freedom index can be broken down into three major components: (1) size of 
government, (2) takings and discriminatory taxation, and (3) labor market freedom. First, 
the size of government is based on general government expenditures, transfer payments, 
and subsidies. Second, government taxation incorporates total government revenue from 
own sources, income tax rates and thresholds, indirect taxes, and sales taxes. Third, the 
labor market flexibility is based on minimum wage earnings, government employment, 
occupational licensing, and union density.  
  3Kreft and Mafi-Kreft: Preliminary Working Draft 
 
Given this structure of the economic freedom index, there are eight different 
freedom scores to analyze for each state as both the all-government index and the state 
and local index can be analyzed in terms of the overall composite index and its three 
component scores. What we intend to do within this paper is test for the direction of 
causality between entrepreneurial activity and the various economic freedom scores 
within the fifty US states. In line with Kreft and Sobel (2005) we expect that economic 
freedom will cause entrepreneurship in a given state because there is an institutional 
environment that is conducive to entrepreneurs. Stated another way, we believe that 
entrepreneurial activity will flow to the areas of highest economic freedom, so it is 
freedom that proceeds entrepreneurship. 
 
III. Data and Granger Causality Model 
The causality test procedure used here, builds on the Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) 
causality framework by modifying the test to incorporate the pooled time-series 
properties of all the fifty states. One problem that may arise in using the pooled state data 
is that the differences across states may be significant enough to bias the true time series 
information that is available in the data. Following the approach of Blomstrom, Lipsey, 
and Zejan (1996), Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger (1998), and Kreft and Sobel (2005) state 
fixed effects are included in each regression specification to avoid the possible bias by 
controlling for any state-specific influences.
1 Specifically, the effect of the state fixed 
                                                 
1 The state fixed effects coefficient estimates are not reported with the causality regression results but are 
available on request to the authors.
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effects is to remove the cross-sectional differences of the states, while leaving only the 
time series variations to be analyzed.
2
  The general Granger-Sims causality test of two variables X and Y, modified for 
state panel data can be seen in the following equations, where equation (1) tests causality 
running from X to Y, and equation (2) tests causality running from Y to X.
 
Yt,i  =  αi  +  ∑
m=1
M
 αm Yt-m,i     +  ∑
n=1
N
 αn Xt-n,i     + εt,i  (1) 
Xt,i  =  βi  +  ∑
v=1
V
 β vXt-v,i     + ∑
w=1
W
 β wYt-w,i     + δt,i  (2) 
Note that the subscript i refers to the corresponding state observation; the error terms εt,i 
and δt,i are assumed to be white noise; and, the number of lagged values (M and N or V 
and W) of the independent variables are chosen to adequately capture the relationship 
between X and Y. 
  To check for a one-way causal relationship, both directions of causality have to be 
investigated. In order to test if X Granger causes Y, equation (1) is estimated with and 
without the lagged X variables, and then an F-test is performed to test the null hypothesis 
that αn = 0 for n=1,…,N. Rejecting the null hypothesis would show that X Granger 
causes Y. In order to test if Y Granger causes X, equation (2) is estimated with and 
without the lagged Y variables, and then an F-test is performed to test the null hypothesis 
                                                 
2 The Granger causality framework and the testing procedures involved are still somewhat controversial in 
economics. Obvious limitations to the methodology (like Christmas card sales causing Christmas) are 
discussed and highlighted in Bishop (1979). 
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that βw  = 0 for w=1,…,W. Rejecting the null hypothesis would show that Y Granger 
causes X.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
This modified Granger-Sims causality framework is used to run causality tests 
between the various economic freedom scores and our two measures of entrepreneurial 
activity: sole proprietorships and patent activity in the United States between 1981 and 
2003. The first measure, sole proprietors, is widely supported in the literature as a viable 
indicator of entrepreneurial activity; however the second measure, patent activity, was 
introduced by Kreft and Sobel (2005). Descriptions of all variables used in this paper, 
along with the sources of this data, are given in Table 1. 
 
IV. Granger Causality Test Results 
First we performed tests to determine the direction of causality between the two measures 
of state entrepreneurship: patent activity and sole proprietors, and the results are 
presented in Table 2. Our results reveal that dual causality exists between sole proprietors 
and patent activity. The dual causality result is not surprising considering that sole 
proprietors and patent activity are intended to measure the same thing—the level of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Next we perform tests to determine the direction of causality between 
entrepreneurship and the overall composite freedom scores for both the all-government 
index and the state and local index, and the results are presented in Table 3. Examining 
the all government index, specifications (1 and 3) together reveal that economic freedom 
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causes patent activity, while specifications (2 and 4) together reveal no causal 
relationship exists between economic freedom and sole proprietors. These results are 
slightly different when examining the state and local index. Specifications (5 and 7) 
together reveal that no casual relationship exists between patent activity and economic 
freedom, while specifications (6 and 8) together show us that economic freedom causes 
sole proprietors.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Taken as a whole, our results from the composite index causality tests gives some 
support that economic freedom is causing entrepreneurship; however the support is not 
overwhelming as the casual relationship between the two measures of entrepreneurship is 
impacted by which freedom index you are examining. This prompted us to analyze the 
individual components of economic freedom: (1) size of government, (2) government 
taxation, and (3) labor market freedom, to see if stronger casual relationships can be 
found between entrepreneurship and the components of economic freedom. We will 
present the results of this exercise next. 
The causality test results between entrepreneurship and the economic freedom 
component 1 (size of government) scores for both the all-government index and the state 
and local index presented in Table 4. Examining the all government index, specifications 
(1 and 3) together reveal that patent activity causes the size of government component of 
economic freedom and specifications (2 and 4) together confirm this finding when using 
sole proprietors. Furthermore, when examining the state and local index, the results 
remain the same: specifications (5 and 7) together reveal that patent activity causes the 
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size of government component of economic freedom and specifications (6 and 8) together 
reveal the same relationship when using sole proprietors.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
The coefficient estimates of patent activity in specification (1 and 5) and sole 
proprietors in specification (2 and 6) being negative suggest that higher levels of 
entrepreneurial activity lead to a decrease in the freedom score generated by the size of 
government. A decrease in freedom component 1 signals an increase in government 
spending, subsidizing, and transfer payments. So basically, our results suggest that once 
entrepreneurship is prevalent in a given state there is a higher rate of government 
spending that follows, which we feel shows the lobbying presence of entrepreneurs and 
the ability of them to elicit higher transfers from government. This follows closely the 
literature on entrepreneurial survival rates, such as Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 
(1994), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), and Kreft and Sobel (2005) that present 
evidence that financial support is vital to the survival of entrepreneurial ventures. 
The causality test results between entrepreneurship and the economic freedom 
component 2 (government taxation) scores for both the all-government index and the 
state and local index are presented in Table 5. Examining the all government index, 
specifications (1 and 3) together reveal that economic freedom causes patent activity, 
while specifications (2 and 4) together reveal no causal relationship exists between 
economic freedom and sole proprietors. Again, these results are slightly different when 
examining the state and local index. Specifications (5 and 7) together reveal that no 
casual relationship exists between patent activity and economic freedom, while 
specifications (6 and 8) together show us that economic freedom causes sole proprietors.  
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(Insert Table 5 about here) 
These results suggest that there is some evidence that low taxation causes 
entrepreneurship, however the support is not overwhelming as the casual relationship 
between the two measures of entrepreneurship is impacted by which freedom index you 
are examining. This would seem to support the overall findings of the taxation literature 
thus far, which has had trouble conclusively showing that taxation has a significant 
impact on entrepreneurship. See Bruce and Mohsin (2006) for a discussion on the mixed 
results concerning the link between taxation and entrepreneurial activity. 
The causality test results between entrepreneurship and the economic freedom 
component 3 (labor market freedom) scores for both the all-government index and the 
state and local index are presented in Table 6. Examining the all government index, 
specifications (1 and 3) together reveal that the labor market freedom component causes 
patent activity and specifications (2 and 4) together confirm this finding when using sole 
proprietors. Furthermore, when examining the state and local index, the results remain 
the same: specifications (5 and 7) together reveal that the labor market freedom 
component causes patent activity and specifications (6 and 8) together reveal the same 
relationship when using sole proprietors.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
  This result that labor market freedom causes entrepreneurial activity demonstrates 
that policies directed towards flexibility in the labor market could be successful tools in 
attracting and promoting entrepreneurship in the states. For example, “right to work 
states” or states without increased minimum wage laws over the federal level would 
enhance the environment for entrepreneurship. 




Within this paper we extended the work of Kreft and Sobel (2005) to include causality 
tests between economic freedom indicators and measures of entrepreneurial activity. 
Specifically, we ran Granger causality test between economic freedom and two measures 
of entrepreneurship: sole proprietors and patent activity in the fifty US states from 1981-
2003. Our results suggest that economic freedom does cause entrepreneurship, especially 
in regard to two of the major components of economic freedom: labor market flexibility 
and low taxation. However, we also find that entrepreneurial activity causes growth in the 
size of government spending, which is correlated with a reduction in economic freedom. 
Thus, we demonstrate that proper tax construction and labor market regulation can attract 
and promote entrepreneurship; however, once a base of entrepreneurs is generated within 
a given state, they will effectively elicit financial support form the governing body. 
  The direction that we would like to pursue next would be to gather international 
data on entrepreneurial activity and see if the same directions of causality hold with the 
different economic freedom indexes and components. The difficulty in this extension 
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Table 1: Data Description and Sources 
Variable Name (source) Description  Mean St.  Dev 
Measures of Entrepreneurial Activity      
  Sole Proprietors (1) 
 
Annual Non-farm proprietors employment 
as revealed through income tax data  419288.5 504617.8 
  Patent Activity (2) 
 
Number of annual utility patents granted 
in the U.S., which are received for all 
general U.S. inventions 
1150.8 1870.1 
     
Economic Freedom Scores      
  All Government Economic Freedom  
  Index (3) 
Composite index measure of federal, state, 
and local policies that affect individual 
economic freedom 
6.5 0.6 
     All Government Component 1  Size of Government  7.3 0.8 
     All Government Component 2  Takings and Discriminatory Taxation  5.8 0.9 
     All Government Component 3  Labor Market Freedom  6.5 0.8 
  State and Local Government 
  Economic Freedom Index (3) 
Composite index measure of state and 
local policies that affect individual 
economic freedom 
6.9 0.7 
     State Government Component 1  Size of Government  7.4 1.0 
     State Government Component 2  Takings and Discriminatory Taxation  6.9 0.8 
     State Government Component 3  Labor Market Freedom  6.5 0.9 
     
 
(1)  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, State and Local Area Data, 
Washington, D.C. 
(2)  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Utility Patent Counts by Country/State and Year, Washington, D.C.  
(3)  Karabegovic, McMahon, and Black Economic Freedom of North America (2006). 
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Table 2:  
Patent Activity and Sole Proprietors, 1981-2003 
(absolute t-stats) 




 (1)  (2) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  913.072***  2926.063* 
    (63.60)  (1.92) 
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)  88.613***  97866.586*** 
    (9.94)  (103.38) 
    
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  98.79***  3.68* 






    
   R-squared  0.99  0.99 
   Number of Observations  1100  1100 
    
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Notes: State Fixed effects were included in each regression specification and the coefficient estimates are 
available upon request. 
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Table 3:  
Entrepreneurship and Composite Economic Freedom, 1981-2003 
(absolute t-stats) 
  Economic Freedom  Patent Activity  Sole Proprietors 
All Government Economic 
Freedom Index  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.802***  0.800***  44.581***  819.089 
    (63.43)  (60.47)  (2.98)  (0.51) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  0.005    1030.026***   
    (0.81)    (130.18)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    0.001    99325.216*** 
      (0.84)    (189.13) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  0.66  0.71  8.87***  0.26 
   Results  Patent Activity 
Does Not Cause  
Freedom 
Sole Proprietors 






Does Not Cause 
Sole Proprietors 
        
   R-squared  0.93  0.93  0.98  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
State and Local Government 
Economic Freedom Index  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.759***  0.759***  27.323  3992.445* 
 (44.75)  (44.86)  (1.29)  (1.86) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  0.001    1033.750***   
 (0.18)    (131.96)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    0.002    99293.763*** 
   (0.40)    (201.49) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  0.03  0.16  1.67  3.47* 
   Results  Patent Activity 
Does Not Cause  
Freedom 
Sole Proprietors 
Does Not Cause 
Freedom 
Freedom 





        
   R-squared  0.95  0.95  0.98  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Notes: State Fixed effects were included in each regression specification and the coefficient estimates are 
available upon request. 
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Table 4:  
 Entrepreneurship and Freedom Component 1: Size of Government, 1981-2003 
(absolute t-stats) 
  Economic Freedom  Patent Activity  Sole Proprietors 
All Government Economic 
Freedom Component 1  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.879***  0.877***  26.300  -428.637 
    (57.63)  (57.61)  (1.64)  (0.26) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  -0.023***    1035.024***   
    (3.08)    (133.87)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    -0.017***    99422.095*** 
      (3.63)    (203.46) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  9.49***  13.16***  2.69  0.07 







Does Not Cause 
Patent Activity 
Freedom 1 
Does Not Cause 
Sole Proprietors 
        
   R-squared  0.95  0.95  0.98  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
State and Local Government 
Economic Freedom 
Component 1  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.851***  0.844***  -1.097  -323.823 
 (55.109)  (53.94)  (0.09)  (0.27) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  -0.024**    1035.323***   
 (2.39)    (133.46)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    -0.021***    99398.956*** 
   (3.24)    (199.81) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  5.69**  10.49***  0.01  0.07 







Does Not Cause 
Patent Activity 
Freedom 1 
Does Not Cause 
Sole Proprietors 
        
   R-squared  0.93  0.93  0.98  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Notes: State Fixed effects were included in each regression specification and the coefficient estimates are 
available upon request. 
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Table 5:  
 Entrepreneurship and Freedom Component 2: Government Taxation, 1981-2003 
(absolute t-stats) 
  Economic Freedom  Patent Activity  Sole Proprietors 
All Government Economic 
Freedom Component 2  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.782***  0.783***  15.609*  -861.804 
    (46.59)  (46.15)  (1.68)  (0.90) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  0.014    1034.725***   
    (0.97)    (133.72)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    0.001    99488.776*** 
      (0.15)    (201.49) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  0.94  0.02  2.81*  0.81 
   Results  Patent Activity 
Does Not Cause  
Freedom 2 
Sole Proprietors 






Does Not Cause 
Sole Proprietors 
        
   R-squared  0.83  0.83  0.98  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
State and Local Government 
Economic Freedom 
Component 2  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.713***  0.715***  -9.629  3072.780** 
 (37.57)  (37.69)  (0.62)  (1.96) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  0.014    1035.584***   
 (1.47)    (133.72)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    0.008    99463.619*** 
   (1.39)    (203.75) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  2.17  1.95  0.39  3.85** 
   Results  Patent Activity 
Does Not Cause  
Freedom 2 
Sole Proprietors 
Does Not Cause 
Freedom 2 
Freedom 2 





        
   R-squared  0.91  0.91  0.98  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Notes: State Fixed effects were included in each regression specification and the coefficient estimates are 
available upon request. 
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Table 6:  
 Entrepreneurship and Freedom Component 3: Labor Market Freedom, 1981-2003 
(absolute t-stats) 
  Economic Freedom  Patent Activity  Sole Proprietors 
All Government Economic 
Freedom Component 3  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.889***  0.886***  25.548***  2369.765** 
    (122.03)  (110.20)  (2.75)  (2.28) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  0.001    1027.706***   
    (0.08)    (125.36)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    0.004    98744.297*** 
      (0.95)    (172.72) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  0.01  0.90  7.58***  5.17** 
   Results  Patent Activity 
Does Not Cause  
Freedom 3 
Sole Proprietors 








        
   R-squared  0.96  0.96  0.99  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
State and Local Government 
Economic Freedom 
Component 3  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Freedom (t-1)  0.873***  0.868***  37.087***  3113.862** 
 (87.15)  (80.38)  (2.90)  (2.22) 
   Patent Activity (t-1)  -0.002    1027.638***   
 (0.28)    (125.98)   
   Sole Proprietors (t-1)    0.003    98830.042*** 
   (0.77)    (177.65) 
        
   F-statistic [1, 1048]  0.08  0.59  8.40***  4.91** 
   Results  Patent Activity 
Does Not Cause  
Freedom 3 
Sole Proprietors 








        
   R-squared  0.97  0.97  0.99  0.99 
   Observations  1100  1100  1100  1100 
        
Significance Levels are represented by the following: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
Notes: State Fixed effects were included in each regression specification and the coefficient estimates are 
available upon request. 
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